7Consider the following static Bayesian game:1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2,each game being equally likely.T2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Rowplayer does not.B3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooseseither L or R.4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature.ColumnLRT 1,1 0, 0B 0,0 0,0Game 1, Pr(A) = 1/2Rowa) True or false? The static Bayesian game defined above has asymmetric information.b) How many types does the Row player have? How many types does the Columnplayer have?c) A strategy in a static (simultaneous) Bayesian game describes an action foreachthat a player could bed) Fill in the blanks in the normal form representation of the Bayesian game definedaboveLL0.5, 0.5ColumnLRT 0,00,0B 0,0 2, 2Game 2, Pr(B) = 1/20.5, 0.5Row1,1RLRR0,0Je) What components define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a static game ofasymmetric information? Select all from the list below. i. strategies, ii. Beliefs aboutthe opponents' types, iii. Types iiii. Payoffsf) Select all the strategy profiles that correspond to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of thisgame. i. (T, LL), ii. (T, RR), iii. (B, LR), iiii. (B, RR)

Given information There are 2 players: Row player and Column player There are 2 games: Game A and…

Consider the following static Bayesian game: 1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. 2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row player does not. 3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses either L or R. 4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature. Column Column

Consider the following static Bayesian game: 1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. 2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row player does not. 3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses either L or R. 4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature. Column Column

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.11P

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