There is a beach with nine regions in it and two pop sellers must choose in which region to situate. Customers in each region walk to the closest seller to buy a pop. Each pop is sold for $1 each. Suppose that the customers are not distributed evenly across the regions. Regions 2 through 9 each have 10 customers but region 1 has x customers. For what values of x does the strategy of locating in region 2 dominate locating in region 1? In particular, what is the maximum value of x for this to be true? Please show all your calculations in your written solution.

There is a beach with nine regions in it and two pop sellers must choose in which region to situate. Customers in each region walk to the closest seller to buy a pop. Each pop is sold for $1 each. Suppose that the customers are not distributed evenly across the regions. Regions 2 through 9 each have 10 customers but region 1 has x customers. For what values of x does the strategy of locating in region 2 dominate locating in region 1? In particular, what is the maximum value of x for this to be true? Please show all your calculations in your written solution.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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