Apublic good costs PLN 300. Three people vote on whether or not to deliver this good. The gross utilities from consumption of the public good for these individuals are as follows:Ua=-50，Ub=50，Uc=250. A.Who will pay the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke tax if a majority vote is applied? B.Who will pay the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke tax if the decision to deliver the public good is based on net utility sum?

Apublic good costs PLN 300. Three people vote on whether or not to deliver this good. The gross utilities from consumption of the public good for these individuals are as follows:Ua=-50，Ub=50，Uc=250. A.Who will pay the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke tax if a majority vote is applied? B.Who will pay the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke tax if the decision to deliver the public good is based on net utility sum?

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter11: Public Goods And Common Resources

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2PA

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